I. INTRODUCTION
Section 4 of the [Immigration Ordinance 1971] effectively exiles the Ilois from the territory where they are belongers and forbids their return. But the 'peace, order, and good government' of any territory means nothing, surely, save by reference to the territory's population. They are to be governed, not removed. . . . These people are subjects of the Crown, in right of their British nationality as belongers in the Chagos Archipelago. As Chitty said in 1820, the Queen has an interest in all her subjects, who rightly look to the Crown-today, to the rule of law which is given in the Queen's name-for the security of their homeland within the Queen's dominions. But in this case they have been excluded from it. It has been done for high political reasons: good reasons, certainly, dictated by pressing considerations of military security. But they are not reasons which may reasonably be said to touch the peace, order and good government of [the British Indian Ocean Territory]. 1 With those words, Laws, LJ, alluding to Wednesbury 2 principles, limited the British Government's ability to manipulate the nationality and belonger status of those it governs so as to dissociate them from their habitual territory of residence, even for high political, military or diplomatic reasons. With passage of time and assessed in context, the decision, which the Foreign Secretary has said he will not appeal, may acquire status as declaratory of certain principles of humanitarian and nationality law that transcend frontiers: notably including the notion that whether a territory is recognised by its own or any other government as a State or as a territory as to which traditional inhabitants have vested rights, such inhabitants do have such rights and governments are not free to change their status and to deny them rights for reasons of political expedience. This is implicit in the decision's finding that the United Kingdom government contrived to maintain the fiction that the inhabitants of Chagos (the Ilois) did not comprise a permanent or semi-permanent population while denying, notwithstanding acceptance elsewhere as a principle of international law, 3 that a State is precluded from refusing its own nationals the right of entry or residence. 4 This article seeks to highlight some of the anomalies and inconsistences in nationality theory and law resulting in part from the lack of any consistent, logical practice in recognition of Statehood. Issues of diplomacy, politics, international law, immigration, national security and commercial expedience conflict with the social reality of human beings living in a particular geographic space over which sovereignty may be contested. For this reason, there is little uniformity in the recognition of nationalities as status and in the legal consequences that flow from such recognition. Indeed, different nationalities may be attributed to the same individual for different purposes, either as a matter of option or involuntarily, and this may or may not be related to the recognition issue. That is one manifestation of the modern shift in the nature and function of nationality from source of obligations towards source of rights, and of the quality of those rights from the political towards the economic. An attempt has been made here to cite actual cases and controversies to illustrate relevant points. Understandably such cases are infrequent, and particular opinions may be more illustrative than evidence of settled law even within the jurisdiction in question.
A. Defining nationality
Nationality is commonly defined as a 'politico-legal term denoting membership of a State', 5 a political entity 'vested with the character of a subject of international law'. 6 The proffered definition does not allow either for the margin of appreciation allowed other jurisdictions in giving effect to that nationality, or for the situation of those whose relationship is with a territory not recognised as a State. Indeed, modern (and postmodern 7 ) trends in nationality law have left 10 & 18 Oct 1970 , YB, 13, 1970 , p. 928, Report of 14 Dec 1973 , DR, 78-A, 1994 App 4626/70, 6 Mar 1978, DR, 78-A, p. 5. (2d edn, 1979) , p. 3. Other major postwar texts on the international aspects of nationality include Haro F. van Panhuys, The Rôle of Nationality in International Law (1959) ; Nissim Bar-Yaacov, Dual Nationality (1961) ; Ruth Donner, The Regulation of Nationality in International Law (2d edn 1994); Michel J. Verwilghen, 'Conflits de nationalités, plurinationalité et apatridie ', (1999) 277 Rec. des cours 9 (includes an extensive bibliography). Domestic aspects of nationality law, denaturalisation and decolonisation issues are treated in treatises including Laurie Fransman, British Nationality Law (1998); Pâquerette Thuilier, Guide pratique de la nationalité française (2d edn, 1997); Ann Dummett & Andrew Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others: Nationality and Immigration Law (1990) ; Paul Lagarde, La nationalité française (3d edn, 1997); Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure, (looseleaf, 2000) . Foelix, in 1834, was the first to write in terms of nation and nationality and participation in (belonging to) the nation as a collective: Traité du droit international privé ou du conflit des lois de différents nations en matière de droit privé, (3rd edn 1856), vol. 1, § 1. Weiss, Pillet and Niboyet replaced 'nation' by 'State'. United Kingdom practice of that era is discussed in Sir Francis Piggott, Nationality: Including Naturalisation and English law on the High Seas and Beyond the Realm (1906 nationality with a relativity largely unrecognised in the literature although that quality is implicit in the holding of the 1955 Nottebohm 8 judgment. Ironically Nottebohm's endorsement of the principle of effective nationality occurred during an era that saw the beginnings of the current rights-centred approach to nationality and statelessness, and at the time that decolonisation and proliferation of independent statehood were just beginning.
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The 13 and elsewhere. However, with few exceptions 14 such international instruments do not provide a specific remedy for the aggrieved individual by way of external right of action against the State. Where a remedy, international or national, does exist, it is by derogation; 15 and unrecognised States are not signatories to such conventions. As economic rights have become more clearly defined in human rights terms, this lacuna has increased in significance. Under some circumstances a patron State may be held responsible for economic injury caused by an unrecognised client State, but that would depend upon the hazard of international commitment and available forum. 16 For its holders, nationality has become as much a bearer of economic as of political rights, deriving for many its greatest importance from the right of abode and economic activity it affords. Diplomatic protection, object of many earlier cases and another economic attribute but one more closely associated with recognised Statehood, now may potentially be finessed as a matter of insurance contract 17 or treaty. 18 OCTOBER 2001] Nationality and the Unrecognised State 851
With respect to private law matters, a State's pretension to control the familyand succession-law affairs of its nationals or domiciliaries may be susceptible to frustration, the laws to evasion. In any case, there has been a convergence of some of the more important aspects of the law of personal status and the family. For example, divorces are today available almost everywhere in the West on terms not excessively onerous. 19 Few jurisdictions except for those which base choice of law on nationality 20 and also maintain regimes of perpetual allegiance 21 would view personal law as immutable. Even under systems of legal pluralism 22 personal law, otherwise fixed, might be changed within the limits of allowed religious conversion. 23 Western countries meanwhile have become more tolerant of alien practices that once might have been refused recognition as violative of public policy. Personal autonomy in matters of private contract is largely respected; wealth is increasingly held in the form of financial instruments rather than land. Perhaps at some risk of judicial attack, 24 factor in legal relations 30 have made of nationality, especially in Western countries, a right largely divorced from the ethnic identity that supported the concept in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 31 It is that 'ethnic identity' that has been the chief (although not the only) basis for contemporary fractioning of sovereignty and nationality and for some cases of non-recognition. Meanwhile, plural nationality has become more tolerated and more common, largely through the recharacterisation of nationality as a matter of rights more than obligations and growing judicial and legislative intolerance of gender inequality in its transmission. It has become increasingly difficult, consistent with human rights, for the State unilaterally to revoke the nationality of one of its citizens. 32 Nationality has become more ambiguous: by this is meant that it no longer bears a single meaning 33 and indeed that certain individuals may be considered to have different nationalities for different purposes. 34 Such a phenomenon should be unsurprising to the Anglo-American lawyer, for the same person can be deemed under English law domiciled in one United States or United Kingdom jurisdiction while the other jurisdiction attributes to him or her a different domicile. 35 Yet universality of nationality however variable its definition is underlined by the fact that nationalities have existed even in States which had not, for the time being, enacted any law to define them, notably China before 1909 and Israel before 1952. If they can exist without legislative creation, it is plausible that they can exist without State recognition, without being related to a unique sovereignty: this equates to the status of belonger whether or not superimposed upon a formal [British Dependent Territories] citizenship. Anomalies in nationality law have arisen in the context of unrecognised States and governments (as elsewhere) as a result of the changing views on human rights and gender equality, of improved communications and transport, of the closure of frontiers to migration and the consequent quality of favoured nationalities as economic good (even, for some, a 'dowry'), and of the politico-diplomatic tests apparently applied in international and bilateral recognition of Statehood. Such tests date perhaps from the Stimson Doctrine; they may contain both a commercial-interest component and an element of expedience and pragmatism. Criteria for admitting of Statehood reflect conflict of policies and engender conflict of laws, something inherent in the distinction between de facto and de jure recognition. Lately, courts and legislatures have come to appreciate that the rejection of a governing (or governed) entity should not impinge upon certain inherent rights of individuals. 36 Furthermore, only by defining 'nationality' expansively and without regard to recognition for purposes of deportation could migrants' destination countries assure the integrity of their restrictive immigration regimes.
The foregoing is a rather condensed adumbration of the recent evolution in nationality law and practice. Exceptions and anomalies always existed, but these were less relevant when subject peoples had few or no enforceable rights. The nationality paradigm today encompasses several exceptional groups of variable significance. Their exceptional nature may serve as pretext for governments elsewhere to deny their groups' members some rights normally attributed to holders of a nationality. The distinction among the first four subgroups is one of degree, and hence subjective:
1a. economically and territorially substantial territories 37 with apparently stable legal and political systems that conduct at least some international relations on a de facto basis and are recognised by at least one country but which, for whatever reason, are denied recognition as sovereign entities by most countries: currently Taiwan, 38 55. This situation may create particular anomalies: a country that has expelled certain of its inhabitants may have consular posts abroad that continue to treat, and to document, the expellees as nationals. This goes to the effectiveness of the government's purported revocation of nationality (where that has occurred) and the apparent authority of the consular officer.
56. Most notably concerning Japanese residents affiliated with the Chosen Soren: Joe Verhoeven, 'Relations internationales de droit privé en l'absence de reconnaissance d'un Etat, d'un gouvernement ou d'une situation ', (1985-III) 192 Rec. des cours 9, 145-48; Her v Akama, Tokyo Dist. Court, 11 Oct 1968 , Hanrejiho No. 531, p. 3, (1972 16 Japanese Ann. Int'l L. 136, holding a violation of fundamental rights Japanese refusal of re-entry visas to certain North Korean nationals seeking to travel to Pyongyang. The court also rejected a passport regulation inhibiting travel of nationals of unrecognised States. Her v Takeji Kobayashi, Sup. Ct., 16 Oct 1970 , 24 Hanreijiho l512, No. 11, (1972 65 Indigenous status or prior residence may yield the right to continued or future residence, and to economic and political activity in a particular geographic area: the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong or Macau, a Native American reservation, a First Canadian reserve: a sub-nationality.
Solutions proffered for some current situations of conflicts of sovereignty and personal status echo certain qualities of past condominium arrangements. Under such arrangements sovereignty or administrative responsibility was shared, and inhabitants were assigned, elected to have, or were treated as having, a particular nationality and personal status. 66 The Belfast ('Good Friday') Agreement provides: (vi) recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland. 67 The preceding provision is at least in part declaratory of existing United Kingdom practice 68 . The status of persons in Northern Ireland under the agreement is a particular legal curiosity. Nearly all 69 are assured the right to present themselves as Irish, as British or both. 70 This is one of few treaty provisions offering a dual national the right to be treated in one country of nationality solely as a national of the other. 71 The 'American Plan' advanced at Camp David on 21 July 2000 for sharing sovereignty over Jerusalem could provide another modern precedent for coexisting nationalities. While non-Israeli residents of East Jerusalem (a territory both of disputed sovereignty and non-recognition as to annexation) did not ipso facto become Israeli citizens upon the incorporation of that part of the city into Greater Jerusalem and Israel in 1967, bona 67. An annexed declaration defines the affected persons: 'The British and Irish Governments declare that it is their joint understanding that the term "the people of Northern Ireland"' in paragraph (vi) of Article 1 of this Agreement means, for the purposes of giving effect to this provision, all persons born in Northern Ireland and having, at the time of their birth, at least one parent who is a British citizen, an Irish citizen or is otherwise entitled to reside in Northern Ireland without any restriction on their period of residence.' For the Irish government interpretation of the impact of this clause upon the nationality of persons born in Northern Ireland 'stateless' for alienage jurisdiction purposes 73 but at least in the case of those holding Jordanian passports not for purposes of deportation. 74 The recognition given to State-like acts of the Palestinian Authority under the IsraeliPalestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza (Oslo II), whether viewed as an irreversible delegation of authority or not, gives effect to the status it claims for persons under its control. Occupation alone does not transfer sovereignty to the occupying, protecting, mandate or trusteeship power, nor does it affect the underlying nationality of the inhabitants. 75 Statehood for Palestine is expected (and already recognised by some governments) and certain Palestinians possess an inchoate nationality with most of the qualities that implies. 76 Appendix III, Article 28 of Oslo II implies limitations to the power of the Palestinian Authority to confer rights of residence. It may record in its population registry all persons who were born abroad or in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, but only if they are under the age of sixteen years and one of their parents is a resident of the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Thus jus sanguinis and residence, in tandem, have become the criteria for Palestinian 'nationality'. There is no provision for naturalisation. Ultimately, the relationship to a Palestinian State of four distinct categories of ethnic Palestinians will need to be resolved: (a) Palestinians, not refugees, resident of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; (b) Palestinian refugees resident in the West Bank and Gaza; (c) Arab nationals of Israel; (d) ethnic Palestinians resident in other countries. Only the status of Palestinians in category (a) and of their children wherever born was addressed in the accords. The evident restrictions on determination by the Palestinian Authority of who shall be its nationals constitute divergence from the norm, but treaty-based limitations of freedom of action do not affect the essence of sovereignty. Neither does the fact that Israeli consular offices abroad provide administrative and communications assistance to Palestine passport holders on behalf of the Palestinian Authority. In both the Northern Irish and the West Bank-Jerusalem cases nationality has been divorced from sovereignty and recognition.
C. Constituting the 'State' as underwriter of a nationality
A substantial literature exists on the doctrine on recognition of State, 77 
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International 87 Acceptance of passports by foreign governments is purely a matter of political, diplomatic and administrative convenience rather than any status attributable to the travel document itself. During World War II governments in exile performed sovereign functions recognised as such by Allied governments, including the issuance of passports 88 : like the Kuwait government in exile, these were recognised governments without de facto control of their claimed territory.
Taiwan benefits in the United States from quasi-recognition (the facilitation of 'commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan') afforded it under the Taiwan Relations Act. 89 The political limits of the Republika Srpska are fixed by the High Representative in Sarajevo; its domestic assertion of governmental power is tolerated pragmatically. The modern experience of unrecognised or diplomatically isolated States and territories is fairly consistent: domestically the entity may function juridically like any other. Internationally, surrogates, intermediaries or a patron may be found and transactions and communications 89. Pub. L. 96-8, 10 Apr 1979, 93 Stat. 14, 22 US Sec. 3301-16, notably: 'Sec. 4 . (a) The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect the application of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan, and the laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979.' completed at some incremental cost and at some suboptimal level. Thus definition and identification of a 'State' can vary according to context. US and other case law has allowed of differentiation for taxation, 90 commercial relations, 91 alienage jurisdiction, 92 deportation and exclusion, 93 diplomatic practice. 94 Other countries have had to address the question of whether the grant of nationality by a particular political entity shall lead to forfeiture of their own nationality or loss of certain political rights. Would naturalisation by one of its nationals in an unrecognised Taiwan or Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus entail divestiture of the nationality of a State which forbids retention of its nationality upon naturalisation abroad? If that hypothetical seems arcane, courts have indeed had to address the question of whether activation of a latent nationality-one to which a person is entitled as of right, but which is not effective until an appropriate demarche has been made 95 -creates such a conflict. 96 There are no recent cases conditioning recognition of nationality 123 and civil jurisdiction, especially in the United States. 124 The manner in which sovereignty is held and exercised affects in different ways the rights and obligations of those to whom a particular nationality or equivalent identity is attributed. Some of this may be a legacy of past centuries. The status of colonial subjects, indigenous peoples and members of minority religions differed from and was less than that of citizens of the metropole. The sujet français did not enjoy the qualities of a citoyen français. The gap was similar as between German Reichsbürger and Staatsangehöriger, Staatsbürger and Volkszugehöriger, with Eingeborenenbevölkerung in the colonies and protectorates affording still lesser status and rights. 125 Congolese were sujets belges without being Belges; 126 and Native Americans, while American wards, 127 were not recognised as citizens until 1924. 128 The sense of obligation without reciprocity which marked subject status recalls the pre-modern era of sovereignty and allegiance. The practice of the colonial powers, and of the United States in its relations with its outlying possessions, might be viewed as political pragmatism. There is no evidence of those powers having studied or taken into consideration the long-run implications for the culture and domestic economy of the metropole of the national status of natives of the colonies because it was inconceivable that these natives would migrate to Europe or the US in significant numbers. This was so although transfers of indigenous labour, as earlier of slaves, from one territory or possession to another were common. Indeed, taken literally, the legitimate offspring of a Belgian mother and a native Congolese father would have been stateless. 129 The United Kingdom, the exception, applied its common-law criterion of allegiance based upon birth within the Empire; nationality by descent was statutory; and naturalisation within a country of Empire or Commonwealth would not provide the same latitude of citizenship as that by birth. 130 Although language and culture were made criteria for nationality in treaties ending the First World War, as regards outlying possessions sovereignty alone governed attribution of some form of 'nationality', if not of civil rights.
Generalised access by colonial migrants to employment and professional activity in Europe had to await the end of the Second World War. Earlier, the migrant subject who did come to the imperial capital would not be repulsed, but except in the United Kingdom for full civil rights to be enjoyed by the migrant naturalisation might be required. 131 The native of a protectorate, 132 of a mandate or of a trust territory 133 might have a separate and inferior 134 status.
Quasi-national, or at least protégé, status for diplomatic protection purposes might be justified by employment relationship with the protecting power or a firm or organisation furthering that power's interests, 135 or by concession or right of subrogation granted under treaty. 136 In the era of extraterritoriality and consular courts such rights were more extensive and unilateral; 137 they exist still but in more restricted fashion save in the case of non-national members of a country's armed forces. 138 Affiliation with a territory that lacks recognition as a 'friendly' State may have anomalous results because of repressive measures aimed at the State itself (sequestration, trade embargoes and other measures directed at enemy aliens or intended as diplomatic sanctions), accident of statutory drafting (US alienage jurisdiction 139 ), or because of conditional-or non-recognition of status or authority of the interested party or the granting officer (incorporation, divorce, 140 insolvency, 141 civil judgments, probate 142 ). The national of an unrecognised State and the refugee or expellee whose nationality has been revoked may be assimilated as stateless for some 143 and not other 144 purposes. The status in this regard of married women is less discriminatory than it once was. 145 Although the issue of retroactive remedies for their offspring has not been consistently addressed 146 many have benefited from retroactive reintegration. Another question relates to latent, or pseudo-nationality: the unconditional right to claim a nationality due to facts of birth, marriage or parentage. 147 Unlike the situation in Caglar, where the representative in London of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus found himself attributed unwanted Cypriot nationality as a matter of law, the holder of an inchoate right to nationality cannot involuntarily be attributed that nationality and cannot be denied asylum solely because of such a right, although right of admission to a third country might be a 'relevant circumstance' to be taken into consideration. 148 The Caglar judgment held that inasmuch as the petitioner did not have (for want of recognition of his employing government) diplomatic status, his possession, involuntary or not, of the nationality of the Republic of Cyprus, and hence Commonwealth nationality, under the Republic of Cyprus Citizenship Law 1967 149 would be asserted against him for purposes of determining which regime of income tax assessment should be applied. The Australian Refugee Review Tribunal likewise treated an asylum seeker from Northern Cyprus as a citizen of Cyprus, albeit discounting the possibility of internal flight alternative:
Australia, along with the rest of the world-with the single exception of Turkey-does not recognise the existence of the TRNC and I, in concurring with this international view, do not accept that the TRNC can be regarded as his 'country of nationality'. My view is that he is and remains a citizen of Cyprus. 150 One problem with such treatment is that many inhabitants, born and permanently resident in Northern Cyprus, fall within the definition of national established under the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Citizenship Law 151 but are excluded from Republic of Cyprus nationality either because a parent lacked qualifying status as 'a person of Cypriot origin' or because documentation of facts of birth and parentage satisfactory to the Cypriot authorities is unavailable. It is for each State to determine who are its nationals; however it is not unknown for other States to attribute to a person for its own purposes a nationality that the State in question itself would deny. In Mahaboob Bibi 152 the circumstance was that the Mauritian authorities would not accept the petitioner's proof of parentage and refused her recognition of Mauritian nationality, whereas the United Kingdom authorities, holding that she had a Mauritian father and thus Mauritian nationality at the time of that country's independence, refused her British citizenship under the 1981 Act. As in LevitaMühlstein, 153 a party was attributed for purposes of municipal law a foreign nationality that she did not in fact enjoy. In some revocation of nationality cases, defendants, formerly nationals of countries that prohibit dual nationality, seem to have been recognised later as still (or again) possessing a prior nationality. This may relate to facts not clear in the case reports, such as inscription upon family registers, 154 or it may be a matter of administrative and political convenience. Attribution by one country of the nationality of another will not, of course, assure the admission of such person to the territory to which he or she has thus been assigned, but it may preserve the integrity of the legal principles sought to be applied by the court. It stretches credulity to attribute as an 'effective' nationality that from which the individual in question claims to be a refugee; yet a State or government that is denied recognition may generate a disproportionate number of asylum seekers. As regards personal law, under a rule of immutability of marital regime 155 it has been successfully argued that the personal law of an unwanted country of flight should not be applied. 156 That may not be the case under a rule of partial mutability 157 where the status of pre-existing property as community or separate is deemed unaltered by a change in domicile. 158 The case law suggests that lack of sovereignty in or recognition of a particular territory will impede some, but not all, rights and obligations of individuals belonging to it. Thus, Palestinian mandate nationality acquired in 1935 served to expatriate a claimant to US nationality. 159 Similarly, for purposes of deportation from the United States it was held that the 'word "country". . . is not limited to national sovereignties in the traditional diplomatic sense'. 160 Yet deportation to (or extradition from) an unrecognised State, or to a State that refuses to acknowledge the prospective deportee's national status, may be impossible. A series of recent cases in the United States has addressed the power of the government to incarcerate indefinitely persons subject to deportation orders under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 161 who cannot be returned either for political reasons or because the country of origin refuses to acknowledge the individual as its national. Some recent appellate cases hold that indefinite or prolonged detention, at least where it has not been shown that the detainee is a continuing danger to the public, violates due process guarantees; 162 As with ethnic Albanian Kosovars who continue to find themselves attributed Yugoslavian nationality, conflicts could occur with respect to persons falling within the scope of the nationality laws of other sub-States like Transdniestria 166 and the Republika Srpska 167 who would be subject also to nationality laws of greater scope enacted by internationally-recognised sovereign States. Like the inhabitants of the Republic of Somaliland (Hargeisa), those self-proclaimed breakaway entities while having internally-effective legal systems lack international and diplomatic pretence and do not issue passports. The problem for ressortissants of many such entities appears to be that so long as there are no pressing economic and commercial reasons to the contrary, the countries of intended travel are likely to decline travel documents issued by authorities they refuse to recognise.
E. Disabilities attributable to non-recognition
Certain disabilities which can arise from the mere fact of alienage, most notably the right to own land 168 and to engage in economic activity, might be attenuated by possession of a nationality which affords particular treaty, 169 regional trading arrangements or World Trade Organization rights. Some restrictions may be facially nondiscriminatory 170 but may in fact be enforced selectively, in a manner that evidences racist or politically-biased motivation. 171 Escheat may, or may not, be avoided by corporate, 172 lease, 173 contract, 174 assignment 175 or trust 176 intermediation, or by transmission to an eligible titleholder prior to action in escheat by the State. 177 Still, the mere fact of uncertainty can render a title unmarketable 178 ; and complicity in evasion of the disability 179 can lead to prosecution and escheat of the property. 180 Lack of recognition of status (because of non-recognition of the sovereign status of the nationality State) will usually but not always preclude access to treaty benefits. Thus United Kingdom income tax law grants certain personal exemptions to British, Irish and Commonwealth nonresidents but not to other nonresident taxpayers 181 ; persons who claim the nationality of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and who also are deemed by the Republic of Cyprus to have its nationality would thereby qualify as Commonwealth citizens entitled to the exemption. 182 Persons born in the Falkland Islands of at least one parent a citizen or settled there will possess both British Dependent Territories Citizenship with the right of abode in the United Kingdom, 183 and Argentine nationality. 184 188 The status of nationals of nations which are or have been divided and where sovereignty is in dispute, notably Germany, Vietnam and Korea, who in almost all cases would also meet the criteria for the nationality of the other State, occasionally created anomalies with respect to personal law. 189 More commonly nationals of unrecognised States are treated like stateless persons who for visa and refugee purposes (notably the 'internal flight alternative' 190 ) happen to have a right of return to a particular place of origin. 191 Along with non-availability of reciprocal visa eligibility and visa waiver provisions, 192 this may deprive them of the benefit of double taxation and social security totalisation agreements for wages earned during business travel or residence. Whether admission to a particular country is granted at all may depend on diplomatic and political concerns: the traditional right of every sovereign to admit or deny access, 193 subject only to limited human rights family-reunification 194 and refugee law non-refoulement 195 conditions. jurisdictions. Contemporary views of human rights make racial targeting and enemy characterisation based solely upon ancestry and national origin unsupportable: to this extent, the recognition status of the political entity underwriting a particular nationality is of diminished importance. Such advantages and privileges as depend upon recognition, essentially treaty-based rights, may be lost; those related to fundamental human rights cannot be. The relationship between sanctions and migration pressures, and the relevance of the mere fact of non-recognition of sovereignty to the law of asylum are further complicating elements.
F. Conclusions
The simple fact of a political entity's non-recognition as a State deprives the individual connected with it of some, but not all, the rights associated with its nationality. Where there are conflicting claims to sovereignty, there may be anomalous attribution of rights and obligations. New human rights norms, and the acceptance of demographic pluralism by the major States of inward migration, has avoided in the post-World War II era some of the hardship and injustice the Minorities Treaties 202 failed to remedy after World War I. Non-recognition of the sponsoring government may equate de jure if not de facto to denial of status at least for some purposes, with the further anomaly that certain affected persons are offered or imposed an unwanted identity. For some, mainly economic, functions the normal reference to nationality may be subject to circumvention. The multiple functions that nationality serves-and the multiple meanings it thereby attracts-only serve to highlight the fact that nationality as legal status is more often a matter of political pragmatism and expedience than of logic and consistency.
